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Abstract: This paper examines Islamic militancy and 
liberalism as particular phenomena resulting from a 
complex interplay between Islam and modernity within the 
context of Indonesia. The development of both groups is 
highly conditioned and shaped by modernization. The 
difference in backgrounds leads further to different 
directions in understanding and practicing Islam among 
both groups. Nevertheless, the present day contest between 
the liberals and the militants over the ‘right’ place of Islam 
in Indonesia has deep roots in the past and reflects 
Muslims’ theological, historical, socio-political and 
intellectual struggle before modernity. Accelerated by the 
huge modernization project, the emergence of militancy 
and liberalism articulates the dynamics of Indonesian 
Muslims’ negotiation with Islam, the modern world, and 
their social reality. This paper examines the dialectical 
interaction between the two different groups of Muslims, 
in response particularly to the relationship between Islam 
and modernity.  
Keywords: Militant Islam, liberal Islam, modernization, 
conflict. 
Introduction  
Perhaps due to the strong influence of Sufism in its earliest period, 
Islam in Indonesia has been considered as being ambiguous. On the 
                                                 
1 The earlier version of this paper was presented at the AMSS 34th Annual Conference 
“Muslims and Islam in the Chaotic Modern World: Relations of Muslims among 
Themselves and with others” co-sponsored by Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, 
September 30 – October 2, 2005.   
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one hand, Indonesia Islam is generally claimed to have had a tolerant 
and inclusive face.2 Historically embedded in a pluralistic society, 
Indonesian Muslims are known for their open-mindedness towards 
any ‘wisdom’ from outside worlds, including those of other world 
religious traditions, indigenous systems of beliefs and modern 
ideologies. The history of the nine Muslim saints (wali songo) in Java 
from an earlier period and the Islamic thought reform by 
contemporary figures such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman 
Wahid aptly illustrates this perspective. Many people even believe that 
because of these tolerant and inclusive characteristics, Indonesian 
Muslims could play a leading role in the future.  
On the other hand, viewed from a different perspective, Islam in 
Indonesia is frequently believed as suffering from deep syncretism. In 
this way, Indonesian Muslims’ practices and understanding of Islam 
are seen as less correct or even incorrect and thus in need of 
fundamental correction.3 Not surprisingly, starting as early as the 19th 
century there have been movements of purification that purported to 
instill ‘correct’ Islam in the country.4 Without this due correction, as 
the purificationists’ assumption goes, Indonesian Muslims would be 
just as useless as foam on an ocean’s surface, despite the fact that 
Indonesia has the largest population of Muslims amongst all of the 
Muslim countries. They are, therefore, frequently ignored.  
In fact, this purification or ‘correction’ movement eventually 
results in tension, even conflict amongst people. Some people have 
fought for the ‘purification’ idea, fighting against their fellow Muslims, 
and some others have advocated their traditional values. Social conflict 
in the Paderi movement, which took place between kaum tua (the old 
group) and kaum muda (the young group) in West Sumatra during the 
Dutch colonial era, is a clear example.5  
                                                 
2 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 14.  
3
 
Ibid., p. 15.  
4 Karel A. Steenbrink, Beberapa Aspek tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19 (Jakarta: 
Bulan Bintang, 1984), p. 33.   
5 William R. Roff, “Kaum Muda—Kaum Tua: Innovation and Reaction Amongst the 
Malay, 1900-1941,” in Paper on Malayan History, edited by K.G. Tregonning (Singapore: 
Journal South East Asian History, 1962), pp. 162-192.   
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In the same line, Muhammadiyah—now the second largest mass 
Muslim organization, with approximately 30 million members—was 
initially founded in 1912 for that very purpose of purification.6 Its 
popular slogan was “to fight against TBC” (tahayul, bid’ah, [c]hurafat—
sociologically understood as superstition, ‘unlawful’ religious 
innovation and legend). Eventually, as a response from the 
‘traditionalist’ group, whose Islam is supposed to suffer from 
syncretism, NU (Nahdlatul ‘Ulama) was founded in 1926. It now 
claims to be the Indonesia’s largest mass Muslim organization, with 
approximately 45 million members. Until recently, rivalry between 
these two organizations had been regular part of almost any public 
discourse amongst Muslims in the country. As will be clear in the next 
discussion, this long chain of tension between the ‘purificationist’ and 
the ‘traditionalist’ will contribute to the rising issue of militant versus 
liberal Islam in contemporary Indonesia.  
To go further, when entering into political arena or dealing with 
political interests, often times the main goal of such “correction” 
groups is either to make Indonesia an Islamic state or to implement 
Islamic shari >` ah in public life through state sponsorship. The 
assumption is that, only when manifested through state power will 
Islam be practiced correctly by Indonesian Muslims. The longwinded 
pre-and post-1945 Independence debate over the Indonesian 
Constitution between the “nationalist” and the “shari>` ahist” groups 
clearly describes the issue.7 One group, which included the NU as the 
representative of the traditionalist viewpoint, insisted that as 
multicultural and multi-religious society Indonesia should be based on 
Pancasila.8 Another group, comprising such ‘purificationist’ groups as 
                                                 
6 James L. Peacock, Purifying the Faith: The Muhammadijah Movement in Indonesian Islam 
(Menlo Park, California: The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, 1978).  
7 About the debate, read Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif, “Islam as the Basis of State: A Study 
of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debate in 
Indonesia,” Unpublished PhD dissertation at Ohio University, Athens, 1982.   
8 Pancasila, “The Five Pillars”, is the Indonesian state ideology, consisting of: Belief in 
One Supreme God, Justice and civility among the people, Unity of Indonesia, 
Democracy through deliberations and consensus among representatives, and Social 
justice for all. These Five Principles are claimed as common platform among the 
elements of Indonesian society.  
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Persis and Masyumi, insisted on making Islam the foundation of the 
state.9  
Needless to say, neither traditionalism nor purificationism is a 
matter of genealogy, but of ideology. This arguments helps us to 
understand why, in certain circumstances, as in the case of 
contemporary Indonesia, a similar group, but with different motives 
and orientation, belonging to the ‘purificationists’ might come from a 
very different background. What I am referring to here is militant 
Islam. What makes the purificationist and the militant similar is a 
tendency to perceive Islam as a dividing line between them and 
‘others’, assuming themselves to be superior as they claim to be the 
possessors of truth. Therefore, they are entitled to ‘purify’ or ‘correct’ 
others who, they believe, are inferior and ‘false’. In fact, the so-called 
militant Muslims are usually those who want to practice Islam as 
literally and formally as possible. In addition, they believe that 
everyone else should be like them.   
However, there is a fundamental distinction between the 
purificationist and the militant. Purificationists primarily orient their 
view inwardly into the Muslim community, while militants orient their 
view outwardly. For purificationists, the ‘others’ generally means other 
Muslims with a different understanding of Islam. Since their mission is 
to purify Islamic teachings, non-Muslims are not really their focus. For 
militants, the ‘others’ generally means non-Muslims. If the 
purificationist wants to ‘correct’ their fellow Muslims, the militant 
wants to ‘correct’ the whole world, or at least all those who are 
different from them. Understandably, awareness of the presence of the 
‘others’ in the sense of non-Muslim or non-Islamic world view is 
fundamental here. In relation to the emergence of Islamic militancy in 
Indonesia, the aggressive and imperialistic modern Western world, as 
brought into the country by modernization projects in the name of 
“national development”  is clearly among the strongest factors.  
It is necessary, therefore, to look at the huge modernization 
projects of the Soeharto era as the background and possibly a 
determinant factor for the emergence of militant Muslims in Indonesia. 
To that end, Soeharto’s policies, especially in politics, religion and 
                                                 
9 The various separatist movements on behalf of Islam in the earlier years after 
Independence, however, were not always related to this shari>` ahist group. Many were 
merely political discontents,  using Islam as a mobilizing vehicle to recruit supporters.   
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education will be carefully examined in detail. Interestingly, it was this 
same situation that provided a platform for the liberal Muslim group to 
flourish in the country. Certainly, international factors did play a 
significant role. However, due to the scope and limits of this paper, 
international factors are only assumed to have been implied through 
the modernization project that used the West as the model.  
On Behalf of Modernization, For the Sake of Power  
For Soeharto, Indonesia under Soekarno (1945-1965) was a 
nightmare. Soekarno merely led the Indonesians to busy themselves 
with foamy ‘nonsensical big words’ and slogans about revolution only 
to end up with severely protracted ideological conflicts. Skyrocketing 
prices, huge money inflation, massive poverty and serious political 
segregation were further consequences. Replacing Soekarno at the 
critical moment after a failed 1965 bloody military coup d’etat, 
Soeharto wanted not only to distinguish but also to disconnect himself 
from his predecessor. Fully backed up by the Indonesian army and 
supported by students who were frustrated by Soekarno’s corrupt 
regime and by the middle class group, Soeharto aimed to make a ‘fresh 
start’ for Indonesia. Therefore, he called his era “New Order” in 
opposition to the previous one, which disparagingly he labeled the 
“Old Order”.  
For Soeharto, any ideological debate should be terminated to keep 
national unity and stability. Every potential and actual threat to “unity 
and stability” needed to be paralyzed. Consequently, accused of being 
the main actor of the 1965 coup, communism was prosecuted “to its 
very roots”.10 Although Muslims played a major role in helping 
Seoharto to wipe out communism, disappointingly for many Muslim 
                                                 
10 Accused of being a proponent, member or having any kind of association with the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), some 500 thousand people were killed, mostly by 
the Indonesian military, many others were put imprisoned without trial. In this 
extermination of communists, Muslims played a major role. A Nahdhatul Ulama 
(NU)-affiliation youth organization called GP Anshor was even directly involved in this 
massacre. Until today, the Law prohibiting communism in Indonesia is in effect.. An 
effort made by former President Abdurrahman Wahid to annul that Law, i.e TAP 
MPRS XXV/1966, only provoked wide criticism and disagreements from various 
parts. As a reconciliation effort made by younger members of NU, SYARIKAT (Santri 
untuk Advokasi Rakyat, Santri for People Advocacy) was founded in 2002 to handle 
human right issues especially among the so-called communist victims of 1965 tragedy 
in Indonesia.  
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groups, in the end (political) Islam was perceived by Soeharto as 
equally dangerous as communism. Therefore, any form of Islamism 
was also exterminated.11 Everyone had to accept only Pancasila as the 
final national ideology.12 In order not to repeat the previous crisis, 
political activity was to be sterile and free from ideology.13  
In accordance with that, in 1973, Islamic political parties were 
forced to fuse into one political body, the Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party). Moreover, none of 
the previous strong Muslim political leaders was allowed to play a 
                                                 
11 Since Muslims are a majority (85%), debate has arisen on the place and role of Islam 
in the modern Indonesian nation state since Independence in 1945. Due to the 
emergency condition at that time, the debate was pending in the form of the most 
compromising document called “Jakarta Charter”. During Soekarno’s era this topic 
was repeated for some time and consumed a great deal of energy. Rebellions seeking 
an Islamic state for Indonesia, or part of its territory, even took place in certain areas. 
Impatient with the longwinded and time-consuming debate about the constitution, 
including the place of Islam in national life as a hottest topic, on July 5, 1959, finally 
Soekarno issued a decree by which he dissolved the parliament and named his 
government as ‘Guided Democracy’. In 1963 Soekarno also dissolved Masyumi, a very 
influential Islamic party and the second largest one in 1955 election, giving as an 
excuse the involvement of its leader, M. Natsir, in PRRI rebellion to establish Islamic 
state in Sumatra. At that point, fair debate on the place and role of Islam in the 
modern Indonesian nation state was not properly finished. For the role of Islamic 
political party before Soeharto era, read Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional; 
Kisah dan Analisis Perekembangan Politik Indonesia, 1945-1965 (Bandung: Mizan, 2000). 
Now, wary of this historical experience, although most major Muslim groups, 
including NU and Muhammadiyah, agreed that Indonesia should not be an Islamic 
State, Soeharto believed that political Islam was a very potential threat to his power 
and he refused to open the slightest opportunity for them. With regard to Muslims’ 
major role in helping the extermination of communism in 1965, Soeharto’s hostile 
political attitude to Muslims in general has been perceived as betrayal and has resulted 
in long-lasting frustration.  
12  During the formulation debate, as recorded in Jakarta Charter, the First Principle of 
Pancasila was followed by a clause reads: “with the obligation for adherents of Islam to 
practice Islamic law”. Those “seven words” were finally removed, after longwinded 
and sometimes furious debate, for the sake of democracy. For debate on this issue 
during the earlier years of Indonesia, read B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern 
Indonesia (Leiden: The Hague-Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). On the role of Pancasila in 
contemporary Indonesia, read Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam 
and the Ideology of Tolerance (London and New York: Routledge, 1995). 
13 About the Muslim dilemma concerning the issue of Pancasila as the sole foundation, 
read M. Rusli Karim, Islam dan Konflik Politik Era Orde Baru (Yogyakarta: MW Mandala, 
1992).  
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significant role both in political parties and social mass-based 
organizations.14 Many Muslims called this situation the 
“depoliticization of Islam”.15 In the same manner, Christian and other 
smaller political parties were forcibly fused into another political body; 
the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party). 
One only other political party was allowed to exist, namely Golkar, the 
government party that then became the ruling party for more than 30 
years.  
To prevent any political problems, participation of the people was 
limited to a minimum by a program called “floating mass”. Also, in 
order to forestall any potential threat to Soeharto’s political 
ascendancy, key persons of almost every organization were either to be 
appointed by Soeharto himself, or at least, politically accepted by the 
state.16 This policy was crafted, considering “national unity and 
stability” as the sine qua non for the success of national development 
project. With such a weak civil society exhausted for so long by 
political problems and economic depression, almost none of 
individuals or groups could be expected to control the state power. 
Therefore, the seeds of Soeharto’s authoritarianism grew up rapidly 
and extensively.  
Furthermore, the orientation of Indonesian national life during the 
Soeharto’s period was the economy. Instead of debating over ideology 
and abstract words, people were encouraged to participate in concrete 
programs of national development called “Pelita” (Pembangunan Lima 
Tahun, Five-Yearly Development Program). If in the past Soekarno 
was very critical of capitalism and Western countries, Soeharto sought 
any possible opportunity for cooperation with them. Every door was 
opened to international monetary organizations such as the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The reason for this was obvious: his ambitious national 
                                                 
14 Mohammad Roem, a former Prime Minister and chairman of Masyumi, the most 
influential Islamic party during Soekarno era, was banned from any political activity by 
Soeharto. In one funeral ceremony, Soeharto even prohibited him from praying 
together with other funeral ceremony participants.  
15 Karim, Islam dan Konflik Politik. 
16 Wahid, later the fourth president, was perhaps among those unwanted people due to 
his frequent public criticisms of Soeharto. When Wahid was three times re-elected as 
chairman of NU (1984-1999), Soeharto tried any effort to topple him, but without any 
success. His case is exceptional, though.   
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development project needed a lot of money. Needless to say, 
Soeharto’s developmentalism policy, calling for continued linear 
progress, expansion of production, supremacy of technology, and 
rational design of the social order, was a classic version of what James 
C. Scott called “high modernism”.17  
In order to fully guarantee the success of his national development 
and secure his power, Soeharto not only tightly controlled political life 
but also designed and applied huge social engineering by mapping out, 
structuralizing and rationalizing every aspect of social life. For 
example, each group of people based either on age, sex, profession or 
motive was provided with a particular organization that was 
structurally centralized. Any existing organization for the same 
category or purpose was to be fused into the state-sponsored 
institution. Thus, there was a central organization for laborers, 
peasants, fishermen, teachers, veterans, Islamic scholars, engineers, 
lawyers, journalists, medical doctors, youth groups, women, retirees, 
businesspersons, and artists. Moreover, Pancasila, massively socialized 
through official indoctrination by the state, was also obliged to be the 
sole foundation’ for every one of these organizations.18 The Jakarta 
Charter, a 1945 historical document, which opened the door to the 
return of political Islam, was put off limits for any political discussion.  
Understandably, Muslims reacted in different ways to Soeharto’s 
regime that was authoritarian and immensely powerful. As far as 
Pancasila was concerned, most of the major Muslim organizations, 
such as NU and Muhammadiyah, were able to accept it without serious 
institutional problems as the sole foundation for each organization. 
Some others, however, such as Pelajar Islam Indonesi (PII, Indonesian 
Muslim Students), openly rejected it and chose to dissolve themselves 
and becomes ‘underground’ movements. Another group, Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Muslim Students’ Association), experienced 
protracted internal conflict and finally split into two groups: one 
accepting, the other rejecting the “sole foundation” idea. Nevertheless, 
under the Soeharto regime, most Muslim groups eventually chose to 
concentrate on ritual and social programs or education without 
                                                 
17 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State, How Certain Scheme to Improve Human Condition have 
Failed (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 89.  
18 In 1978, People National Assembly (MPR) issue a decree about this official national 
indoctrination of Pancasila called P4. An official institution, called BP7, was established 
to handle the huge job of indoctrination.  
  
Militant and Liberal Islam 
43 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 01, June 2009 
entering the political arena.19 In fact, as noticed by Olaf Schumann, 
during that time, religious activities would be supported by the 
government only when it was advantageous to national economic 
development.20  
The Seeds of Liberal and Militant Islam  
Nevertheless, for Madjid, who later became the most important 
and outspoken ‘locomotive’ of the Indonesian Islamic thought reform 
movement, Soeharto’s political behavior towards Muslims was “a 
blessing in disguise”. Indeed, for him, since the 1945 independence, 
Indonesian Muslims had spent too much time and energy on politics. 
Nothing more than a deep political segregation that had brought 
Muslims nothing but powerlessness under Soeharto’s authoritarianism, 
political Islam, in fact, did not suit the plurality of Indonesia. In 
response to this, there was a call for Muslims to understand and to 
apply Islamic values more substantially in social life beyond politics, 
beyond short term interests and conflicts under Islamic banners. 
Hence, from the 1970s Madjid promoted what was known as “Islam 
yes, Islamic political party no”. In an era in which many people were so 
haunted by the danger of secularization as a consequence of 
modernization, he publicly declared that secularization was necessary, 
but it should be understood in order to wisely treat anything secular as 
secular, including politics, and anything profane as profane. Clearly, 
Madjid did not adopt the ideology of secularism. He also consistently 
argued that Indonesian Muslims should have no problem with 
Pancasila as the best common platform, creatively formulated by their 
founding fathers to meet the needs of Indonesia’s multicultural and 
multi-religious society.    
To encourage Muslims to participate in national development, 
Madjid also massively promoted the idea that Islam was definitely 
compatible with science, progress and modernity. For him, Islam and 
modernity were not incompatible or counter to each other. When 
modernization was understood as thinking and acting in accordance 
with natural law, then it was a historical necessity; it was a divine 
                                                 
19  Nurcholis Madjid, Islam Kemoderenan dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1998). 
20  Olaf Schumann, “Christian-Muslim Encounter in Indonesia,” in Yvonne Yasbeck 
Haddad, Christian-Muslim Encounters (Jacksonville: University Press of Florida, 1995), p. 
291. 
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order”.21 Furthermore, Islam in itself is always inherently a ‘modern’ 
religion. In order to provide Muslims with theological foundation for 
their social interaction in a plural society, Madjid who was well trained 
both in pesantren (the traditional Islamic schooling system) and the 
Western system of education then formulated a widely praised (and 
criticized) idea of “Islamic inclusive theology”. For many people, 
Madjid had indeed produced a strong and coherent intellectual 
response to Muslims’ peripheral socio-political situation by means of 
establishing ethical and moral foundations for the national 
development project.22 Together with the Paramadina Foundation, 
which he founded in 1986 and which would later become a popular 
center for Islamic studies especially among urban Muslim middle class, 
Madijd laid a very important foundation for the development of liberal 
Islam in Indonesia.  
From the same mold as Madjid is Abdurrahman Wahid, a three 
time-elected chairman of NU (1984-1999) and the fourth President of 
Indonesia. If Madjid’s audience was mainly urban Muslim middle class, 
Wahid, who came from a very strong pesantren background, spoke 
mainly on behalf of and worked with traditionalist Muslims. Being 
aware of his people’s potential and handicaps before the national 
development project, he articulated incessantly and critically the 
challenges and problems of modernization that had to be overcome by  
Muslims and the government together. While some Muslims promoted 
the purification of Islam, which often implied an anti-traditional 
culture stance, if not outright Arabization, he promoted the idea of 
“indigenization of Islam”. For him, the adoption of local culture in a 
proper way was necessary if Islam needed to be an integral part of 
Muslims’ life.  
 Many people at this time, including bureaucrats, held a negative 
view of Muslim traditionalists, that they were backward, ignorant, static 
minded, parochialistic and both economically and administratively 
poor. In response to this view, Wahid always reminded the 
government that modernization should be implemented in accordance 
with the needs, values and culture of the society ― in other words, a 
bottom up, rather than top down policy of social engineering. In the 
                                                 
21 Madjid, Islam Kemoderenan, p. 173.    
22 Samsurizal Panggabean, “Enerji Utopia Nurcholish Madjid,” Ulumul Qur’an, No. 1, 
Vol. IV (1993), p. 34.   
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early 1970s, being aware of huge and long-term social costs resulting 
from the New Order’s paradigm of modernization, together with many 
Muslim leaders and activists, Wahid founded Perhimpunan 
Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M, The Association for 
Pesantren and Community Development), an NGO that offered 
alternative social projects of empowerment especially for pesantren 
people.  
Moreover, in response to political Islam, Wahid argued that instead 
of being taken as the only one, in the Indonesian context, Islam should 
be considered as one among the major resources for the establishment 
of the nation. Instead of being a counter disintegrative factor in the 
national life, Islam should be directed to be a complementary factor.23 
While many political Muslims group cried out for their rights as the 
majority group, Wahid openly criticized any sectarian tendency among 
Muslims,  actively involved himself in inter-religious programs, and 
tirelessly spoke up for the rights of minorities on behalf of democracy. 
Not only did he annul the widespread assumption about the 
incompatibility of the traditional Muslim world with modernity, 
Wahid’s Islam, by definition, as Barton records, was dynamic, 
cosmopolitan, fundamentally tolerant and egalitarian.24  
Together with people like Ahmad Wahib, Harun Nasution, 
Munawir Sjadzali, Djohan Effendi, and Dawam Rahardjo, Madjid and 
Wahid were among the first generation of modern Indonesian Muslim 
thinkers who nourished the seeds of Islamic liberalism during the first 
half of the Soeharto era in the 1970s. As was seen in the previous 
discussion, Islamic liberalism here emerged as Muslims’ struggles with 
modernity. Challenges and responses from both sides departed from 
down-to-earth issues and situations. As reflected in Madjid’s and 
Wahid’s ideas, in responding to modernity, exponents of liberal Islam 
came out with genuine interpretations of universal values of Islam that 
were deeply rooted in its tradition and which were at the same time 
compatible with principles of modernity. It is also worth noting here 
that while this non-political Islamic thought reform was favorable to 
Soeharto’s policy on Islam, it had nothing to do with political support 
                                                 
23 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Massa Islam dalam Kehidupan Bernegara dan Berbangsa,” 
Prisma, Extra Edition (1984), pp. 3-9.   
24 Greg Barton, “Pengantar,” in Abdurrahman Wahid, Prisma Pemikiran Gus Dur 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000), p. xxx.   
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for him, or at least it did not imply such support. As would be seen in 
later developments among Indonesian Muslims, when Soeharto was 
weakening in power, the seeds of liberal Islam began to grow as a 
significant contribution toward the establishment of civil society in the 
country.  
Meanwhile, also as a reaction to the modernization projects 
launched by Soeharto’s government, the seeds of Islamic militancy 
were growing. Unlike Islamic liberalism that had clearer intellectual 
foundations, however, Islamic militancy was rooted more in political 
activism. For those Muslim groups that inherited or at least were 
inspired by political Islam from the past, both nationally and 
internationally, the policies of Soeharto were perceived as a very 
serious threat both theologically and politically. Theologically, any 
separation of ritual Islam and political Islam, for them, would only 
make the religion lose its essence as ‘a total system of life’. Politically, 
for them, Muslims who had already been weakened and kept so by the 
kuffa>r (infidels) for hundreds of years were now successfully 
marginalized even when they were the majority group.   
For militant Muslims, the existing political situation of Indonesian 
Muslims at that time could be taken as evidence. Although Muslims 
were the majority group, they only played a minor role in national life. 
The economy, politics, bureaucracy and most of strategic positions 
were in the hands of non-Muslims.25 It is well known that during the 
first half of Soeharto’s era Indonesian Muslims suffered from 
“numeric majority but mental minority syndrome”. What made 
everything worse was the fact that the Center for Strategies and 
International Studies (CSIS), established in Jakarta in 1971 and 
organized mainly by Chinese and Catholic figures, was ‘unofficially’ 
appointed by Soeharto as his think-tank to handle the economic 
policies for the national development project. It is widely known that 
many influential figures behind Soeharto such as Ali Murtopo, 
Soedjono Hoemardani, L.B. Moerdani and others were CSIS people.  
Meanwhile, another serious problem, in the eyes of militant 
Muslims, was that the so-called “trickle-down effect” approach of 
development had only invited massive and rapid Westernization and 
                                                 
25 This fact is understandable because, sociologically and historically, the well-educated 
group during the colonial period and several decades after independence were mainly 
Christians, while trading networks had long been in the hands of the Chinese ethnic 
group. Up until the 1990s Soeharto was closer to these groups than to Muslims.   
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secularization to Indonesia as a Muslim country. Further, for them, the 
increase in unemployment and crime rate, the huge corruption in the 
bureaucracy, the crisis of values among the youth, liberal ideas and 
behaviors, and various social dislocation problems were actually 
viewed as an intentional, long-term conspiracy by the enemies of Islam 
to destroy Islam and the Muslims.26   
Finally, as a result, some small militant Muslim groups were 
involved in open confrontation with Soeharto’s regime: Komando 
Jihad (1977), Jama’ah Imran Movement (1981),27 Tanjung Priok riot 
(1984), and GPK Warsidi Lampung (1989). Some of these groups had 
certain connections with similar movements in other Muslim countries 
such as al-Ikhwa>n al-Muslimu >n (IM, the Muslim Brotherhood) 
founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt, and Hizbut Tahrir (HT) 
founded in 1958 by Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani in Jerusalem, but some 
did not. With or without international connections, however, generally 
speaking, they shared the same commonalities. For example, these 
commonalities included the perceiving of Islam as the only ultimate 
total system of life and the call for establishing an Islamic state or, at 
least, Islamic shari>` ah.  
Nevertheless, Soeharto’s powerful regime was beyond all their 
power capacity. Accused of organizing any effort to establish Islamic 
state and rejecting the idea of Pancasila as the sole foundation, they 
were effectively suppressed by the government. Soeharto even used 
these cases of militant Muslims to show his unchallenged power. Many 
people were killed in engineered riots’, sent to jails or escaped to other 
countries. Apparently, Soeharto had an effective strategy to repress 
those Muslim militant groups and cut off their networking. However, 
while the old roots were paralyzed, the new Muslim militant groups 
emerged.  
 
                                                 
26 During this period, rumors about systematic, long-term Christianization of 
Indonesia, supported by Western countries such as U.S., Canada, and U.K. were 
widely spread. See, for example, Lukman Hakiem, Fakta & Data Usaha-usaha 
Kristenisasi di Indonesia (Jakarta: Media Dakwah Magazine, 1991), pp. 53-59.  
27 Many sources convincingly show that these two groups were actually created by, or 
at least infiltrated by and then made used of by, Soeharto’s military regime. Here CSIS 
is supposed to have played a very significant role. See, for example, Al-Chaidar, Bencana 
Kaum Muslimin di Indonesia (1980-2000) (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2000).   
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Education: Redemption of the Past, Conflict over the Future  
To understand better the development of both liberal and militant 
Islam in the modern history of Indonesia, it is interesting to examine 
what was happening in public education. Supposedly, in order to 
combat communism, the New Order regime created a policy obliging 
every individual to adopt one of the five official, acknowledged 
religions; Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, or Buddhism.28 
When, thanks to the “oil boom”, in the early 1970s the government 
made substantial improvements in public education, among the others, 
by launching a compulsory education program and building thousands 
of elementary schools, called “SD Inpres”, in every sub-district area 
throughout the country,29 the policy on obligatory adoption of religion 
was further implemented in schools. Religion became a compulsory 
subject from elementary to high school, even up to university level.  
Two important things are worth noting here in relation to our 
topic of discussion. First, due to the compulsory course on religion—
especially Islam in this case—, students coming from a “nominal 
Muslim” background, or “abangan’,30 were systematically made more 
and more familiar with Islam. Previously, the number of nominal 
Muslims, before and during the 1970s, was much larger than their 
fellow practicing Muslims, or santri, but after that period the numbers 
tended to be reversed. At the same time, unintentionally these students 
coming from nominal a Muslim background were ‘detached’ from 
their parents’ traditional system of beliefs which were much closer to 
Hinduism or other local religions. Due to the limitations of learning 
time and the available teachers, the abangan students’ understanding of 
Islam was somewhat limited in comparison to their fellow santri 
                                                 
28 Confucianism, in fact, existed and was acknowledged as a religion during Soekarno’s 
era, but, strangely enough, although the Chinese enjoyed various privileges under 
Soeharto, it was not admitted as a religion during the New Order regime. Together 
with various local religions, it faced problems of survival during that time.   
29 This initiative was based on a special Inpres (Instruksi Presiden or Presidential 
Directives). Therefore the schools were called “SD Inpres”.    
30 About the discussion of the word abangan and santri that will be frequently used 
henceforth, read Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: The Free Press, 1964). 
Of course, the abangan group in its strictest sense is a Javanese phenomenon. While 
keeping other non-Javanese ethnicity in mind, I will argue that what happened to 
Javanese as the largest and the most influential ethnic group in politics and culture 
would have a very substantial, or even ‘exemplary’, effect on the rest.   
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students, who enjoyed regular, systematic and intensive learning on 
Islam both from daily life practices of their family and from the 
mosques or pesantren. Psychologically, on the side of abangan students, 
this fact left a sense of being less Muslim. Nevertheless, in the long 
term, this overturn among the abangan children certainly became a  
factor in the process of “santrinization” (Islamization) and the Islamic 
resurgence in Indonesia.  
Second, since the majority of the population were Muslims, 
particularly the “practicing” Muslim (santri) benefited from this 
compulsory education program. For the first time, Muslims could 
enter a modern secular education system in a massive and affordable 
way. Before that period, practicing Muslim families would send their 
children mostly to pesantren31 to get a better education. Now, chances 
for vertical mobilization, such as those created by the need for a huge 
number of teachers—especially positions for courses on Islam as a 
compulsory subject—both to fulfill the large opportunities provided 
by the increase of schools numbers and to replace the fired communist 
teachers, become a significant and promising avenue for many 
practicing Muslim families to enter secular system of education.  
As a result, according to William R. Liddle,32 over the following 
period, the number of educated “practicing” Muslims increased 
substantially. In this relation, as an initial consequence of national 
development in public education, according to Madjid,33 in the late 
1970s, for the first time Indonesia had a significant number of 
university graduates, most of whom had “practicing” Muslim 
backgrounds. By the 1990s some of those graduates had come to 
occupy various significant positions in bureaucracy, while the others 
had become established professionals. At the same time, universities 
were now flooded with Muslim students, both from nominal and 
                                                 
31 Pesantren are mainly Islamic traditional boarding schools where students learn only 
Islam. Most of them are not acknowledged by the government in terms of a modern 
education system. About the differences, relations, tensions and development of 
Islamic traditional and modern systems of education in Indonesia, read Karel 
Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986).   
32 William R. Liddle, “Skripturalisme Media Dakwah: Suatu Bentuk Pemikiran dan 
Aksi Politik Islam Masa Orde Baru,” Ulumul Qur’an, No. 3, Vol. IV (1993), p. 61.   
33 See Madjid, Islam Kemoderenan, p.81.   
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practicing Muslim backgrounds of the “SD Inpres” generation.34 In 
short, thank to education, a new force of Muslim middle class was 
being formed..  
In line with this massive educational improvement, one thing is 
worth pondering. The way Soeharto’s New Order defined the past as a 
long story of collective memory of trauma: the bloody military coup of 
1965, Soekarno’s corrupt regime, the brutal occupation by the Japanese 
in 1942-1945, the inhuman Dutch colonialism for hundreds of years 
and so on; and they way it defined the future: i.e. modernity is the only 
rational choice for a definite brighter future, had a significant impact 
on this SD Inpres generation’s perception in general. This applied to 
their perception of history and to other matters. As products of an 
education system shaped by the New Order, they also suffered from 
some kind of traumatic view of the past and a superlative dream of the 
future. This was then manifested differently depending on whether 
someone came from a santri or abangan background.  
For those who came from a santri background, modernization, via 
their modern schooling system, had always tended to stigmatize them, 
implying that being santri was backward, static, poor, uneducated, 
unorganized, sectarian, narrow minded. In short, they learned that 
being santri was manifestly ugly in the face of modernity. Therefore, 
this should be overcome in one way or another. In the meantime, 
those who came from an abangan background learned from their 
schools that being abangan meant being irreligious, ignorant, faithless, a 
transgressor, superstitious, and polytheist. In short being abangan 
meant being sinful. As we shall see, these two perceptions of the past 
among young Muslims of SD Inpres Generation from different 
backgrounds eventually lead to conflict over the future.  
Before that, however, now, let us go back first to Soeharto’s 
politics. By the 1990s, a fundamental change had taken place in the 
Indonesian political constellation due to the shift of various elements 
of the society as a result of the national development project and 
influences from external factors. Against expectations, the New Order 
had lost much of its political power and stability. Soeharto’s “growth 
                                                 
34 It is interesting to note that, perhaps due to long socio-historical and cultural 
backgrounds, when university level is affordable, many practicing Muslim families send 
their children to IAIN (State Islamic Universities under the Department of Religious 
Affairs that have close relations to the pesantren tradition), while those of a nominal 
Muslim background will send their children to secular universities.   
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oriented” developmentalism, as the pillar of the order, was decaying 
for many reasons. Instead of real social economic betterment for all, 
economic gaps between the elite and the rest of the people grew wider 
and became irreversible. Despite its stable appearance, the regime’s 
economic structure, as proven later, was actually very fragile. At the 
same time, huge diverse businesses run by each of Soeharto’s children 
and growing mainly based on favoritism now became very a serious 
handicap for the health of the Indonesian national economic system. 
Corruption, collusion and nepotism, resulting from a long history of 
ill-managed bureaucracy, constituted a significant part of the national 
governmental system and led to a high cost economy, feudal “Yes, Sir” 
culture and political totalitarianism. Above all, international debt to the 
capitalist countries quadrupled.  
Therefore, as he began to lose support from the military,35 
President Soeharto, a pragmatist politician, then tried to win over the 
new emerging political force of the Muslim groups.36 In accordance 
with this, the long efforts made by such Muslim thinkers such as 
Madjid and Wahid, as have been discussed in a previous part of this 
paper, also made Soeharto feel more secure with Islam, or at least not 
as cautious as before.  
Soeharto’s government began more actively to sponsor many 
Islamic projects, especially non-political ones. Thousands of 
“Pancasila” mosques, funded by Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila 
(YABMP), one of Soeharto’s foundations, were built all over 
Indonesia. Soeharto also launched a “1000 da’i (Muslim preacher) 
Movement” by sending a thousand Muslim preachers to 
transmigration areas.37 Various festivals on Islam, such as Istiqlal 
                                                 
35 Due to the betterment of education among the Muslims, rivalry between Christians 
and Muslims within the Indoneisan military wase evident at that time. On February 28, 
1988, LB Moerdani, a smart and visionary Catholic general with huge influence within 
the Indonesian military was abruptly remoeved by Try Sutrisno, a young emerging 
Muslim military star and Soeharto’s close adjutant. Read Ben Anderson, “Current Data 
on the Indonesian Military Elite,” Indonesia, Vol. 48 (October 1989), pp. 65-96.    
36 Liddle, “Skripturalisme Media Dakwah”.    
37 This movement aimed at two directions: 1) to improve a designed religious life 
among the Muslim transmigrants in their new settlements outside Java and 2) to 
persuade more people (including those with more knowledge about Islam) to 
participate in transmigration programs, as a means of handling the population problem 
and the huge disparity between Java and outside it. Obviously, this was part of 
Soeharto’s social engineering.   
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Festival and National Qur’a>n Recital Competition, were also celebrated 
annually or periodically. In effect, Islam in general enjoyed more 
freedom to grow. Parliament became greener, symbolizing Muslim 
domination. In accordance with all of the above, ICMI (Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia, all-Indonesian Muslim Intellectual 
Association), a real articulation of the Islamic resurgence among the 
educated Muslim middle class, was founded in 1990. With full support 
from the President, Habibie, one of Soeharto’s closest ministers, who 
later became the third Indonesian president, was appointed chairman 
of this association. Soeharto himself became its distinguished advisor.38  
A spirit of Islamic resurgence was observable everywhere. More 
than in other places in the country, this Islamic resurgence was 
especially transparent in certain universities and among the more well-
educated groups. Interestingly, a zeal for being correctly Islamic, being 
true Muslims and possessing the spirit to practice Islam totally in every 
aspect of life appeared much stronger among the Muslim students of 
secular-state universities. During the fasting month of Ramad}a>n, many 
corners of secular campuses would be crowded with students busy 
with discussions, studies, seminars, workshops, and various festivals on 
Islam. In fact, by that time, as a result of extensive translation, books, 
ideas, and even the movement methods and organizational structures 
of militant Muslim thinkers like al-Banna and al-Mawdudi were very 
popular in Muslim student circles in most reputable “secular-state” 
universities such as UI (Universitas Indonesia), UGM (Universitas 
Gadjah Mada), ITB (Institut Teknologi Bandung), IPB (Institut 
Pertanian Bogor), UNPAD (Universitas Padjajaran), UNAIR 
(Universitas Airlangga) and others. The word “Islamic” was used 
extensively to demonstrate the embodiment of the spirit of “being a 
total Muslim” or practicing Islam correctly and totally. From this time 
on, so-called Islamic journalism, Islamic fashion, Islamic press, Islamic 
food, Islamic sport, and Islamic music became parts of the new 
national discourse. Certain typical ‘Islamic’ ways of dressing, 
addressing peer groups, behaving, and the use of particular 
vocabularies were intentionally used as a means of self-identification. 
As indicated in the previous section, when carefully investigated, 
most of these groups’ members, so energized by the Islamic 
resurgence, in fact came from the “SD Inpres generation” of “nominal 
                                                 
38 On the dynamics of this period, read for example, Hefner, Civil Islam.  
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Muslim” families who, psychologically speaking, were suffering from a 
kind of “less Muslim” syndrome. Why was this so? Uprooted from 
their parent’s tradition, on the one hand, and with minimal knowledge 
about Islam from formal educational institutions on the other hand, 
this “SD Inpres” generation from nominal Muslim families now, in the 
era of the Islamic resurgence, became “eager Muslims”. Furthermore, 
their eagerness in being “true Muslims” grew in a situation where the 
social and political reality was shaped by the New Order in such a way 
as described in the previous part of this article. In this sense, I will 
argue that, more than just eager to true Muslims, these young people 
actually became an “anxious generation”.  
They were anxious about their past: their childhood, their parents’ 
way of life, the neighborhood where they grew up, all of which could 
be seen as far from the “true guidance” of Islam. Some of them would 
refer to their past as a zaman jahiliyah (period of ignorance). They were 
anxious about the present, i.e. their social life that suffered from so 
many complicated problems: “moral decadence”, economic inequality, 
massive corruption, and political authoritarianism. Meanwhile, the 
Muslim people, supposedly ordered to “enjoin what is right and forbid 
what is wrong”,39 were so powerless and even tended to ignore their 
reality. Islam as they saw it around them was merely a set of empty 
rituals. They were also anxious about the future: in a very highly 
competitive and limited job market, what would be left for them? Who 
would marry them? Where was their place in this uncertain period of 
rapid social change? A luxury predicate attached to university students 
as “the future leaders” frequently just added to their accumulative 
burden of anxiety. Yes, theoretically, with higher education they were 
expected to have more access to vertical mobilization. However, in 
practice, higher education now frequently meant disguised 
unemployment.  
In short, they were a generation dreaming of immediate solutions 
to a very complicated situation. At this point, Islam, formulated in 
such a modern and ‘certain’ way as a means of analysis and as a 
solution to real problems, as promoted by al-Banna and al-Mawdudi, 
met their needs appropriately.  
                                                 
39 Taken from al-Qur’an, chapter III: 110 which is frequently used to describe the true 
nature of Muslims. 
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With secular campuses as centers and students as the main 
proponents, in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Ujung 
Pandang and Indonesia biggest cities, Islamic resurgence spread rapidly 
to other elements of society. At UGM Yogyakarta, Jama’ah Shalahuddin, 
an intra-curricular organization for Muslim students became an 
important center of Islamic da`wah both inside and outside the campus. 
Around Jama’ah Shalahuddin many smaller groups of students 
intensively and systematically studied and practiced Islam ‘as correctly 
as possible’. Usually these small groups consisted of five to seven 
people under a mentor. The mentor himself or herself belonged to 
another peer group at a higher level with almost the same number of 
people. Books by al-Banna, Abul A`la al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qut}b, 
Sayyid Sa>biq, Sai >` d Hawwa, and Fathi Yakan were used as sources for 
their studies. This was also the case with Masjid Salman for ITB in 
Bandung and similar organizations on other secular campuses.  
A parallel development also took place on Senior High School 
campuses throughout the country. Islamic section, a sub-organization 
under OSIS, the only intra-organization for High School students 
allowed by the government, became a center for learning intensively 
about Islam.40 During ‘summer vacation’ many alumni from each High 
School, now attending universities, would go back to their alma maters 
to share their spirit and experiences of being part of the ‘true young 
Muslim generation’ in a short course program known as “Pesantren 
Kilat”. Since the 1990s most urban mosques’ activities and programs 
came to be dominated by these young eager Muslims.  
In general, this Islamic resurgence was not an organized 
movement. Despite some informal coordination relating to current 
issues, information sharing, and certain temporary joint programs etc, 
so far there was no structural organization among the movements 
within universities and high school campuses or outside them at 
national level. However, so many people shared the same dream: how 
to transform Islam in their life into a solution for problems.  
In their later development, I would argue, these young Muslims, so 
energized by the Islamic resurgence, could be classified into three main 
groups: the sympathizers, the activists, and the militants. The first 
                                                 
40 In early 1991 the Department of Education finally agreed to let women Muslim 
students who wanted to wear jilbab (veil) to do so as a response to the increase of 
protests against the previous prohibition for the reasons of school uniform.   
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group, the sympathizers, were people involved mainly on the surface 
level of the movement. Their involvement might be only for few years 
during their study time or when they had immediate connection to it. 
Once they found a ‘normal’ or even established place in society after 
finishing school and got reasonable job, these people usually would 
return to a ‘normal life’. The dream of Islamic resurgence and the 
motivation to translate Islam totally into social life would fade 
somewhat from their mind.  
The second group consisted of those who were intensively 
involved in the Islamic resurgence movement during and after their 
studies. These young people usually maintained contact with their 
activist friends, creating sustainable programs and expanding networks 
into wider society as part of a serious, long-term effort to realize an 
exemplary Islamic society. Thanks to their persistent efforts there 
emerged Islamic banks, an Islamic press, Islamic businesses, Islamic 
culture and other Islamic networks. As soon as Soeharto fell from 
power in 1998, these young activists established the Islamic (Welfare) 
Justice Party (PKS) with great success in the following two general 
elections, especially among the well-educated young people in urban 
area.41 Instead of an Islamic State, their main objective was the creation 
of an Islamic society. So far they have become well known for their 
excellent performance in “high politics”.  
The last group, the militants, refers to vehement young people 
who were eager, not only to create Islamic society, but also to formally 
implement Islamic Law (shari>` ah), with or without the establishment 
of an Islamic State in Indonesia.42 For them, only when Muslims 
                                                 
41 From its inception, especially thanks to its promotion of high moral standards, social 
humility and concrete programs for the people, the PKS rapidly gained sympathy and 
influence in Indonesian politics. In only a brief period, the PKS—being the sixth 
biggest party with more than 8 million votes in the 2004 election—could see one of its 
leaders, Hidayat Nur Wahid (44) as the chairman of the People Consultative Assembly 
or MPR, the Indonesian Senate. Visit their website here: www.pk-sejahtera.org   
42 However, it does not mean that the young “nominal Muslim” or abangan is identical 
with militancy. What I mean here is that today we find a tendency towards militancy 
among young people from a nominal Muslim background. In this regard, it is also 
important to divide pesantren into two categories: namely ‘cultural’ pesantren and 
‘political’ pesantren. The latter are political in the sense of adopting the idea of an 
Islamic state as a necessary condition for an Islamic society, an idea that is absent 
among the former. In relation to Islamic militancy, the second type of pesantren plays an 
important role in providing it with leadership.  
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implemented Islamic Law based on the Qur’a>n and Sunnah, would 
those complicated problems  disappear. Otherwise, Muslims would 
never escape their current miserable life and would continue to lose 
out. Unlike the second group, who had no immediate structural or 
organizational connection with international movements, most of the 
militant Muslim groups had global connection with similar movements 
in other countries.  
Some of those connections were HT, Jama’ah Tabligh, Darul 
Arqam, IM, and various Salafist groups that were originally established 
in Palestine, India, Malaysia, Egypt and various Middle Eastern 
countries. Each of those groups had chapters with significant followers 
in many larger cities in Indonesia. Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah 
wal Jama’ah (FKAWJ) founded in 1998, Laskar Jihad, founded in 2000, 
Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia (MMI) founded in 2000, Pesantren 
Ngruki in Surakarta, Central Java, and FPI (Front Pembela Islam, 
Islam Defenders Front) founded in 1998 in Jakarta, were other strong 
militant groups with less identifiable international connections.43  
In addition to introducing the promise of immediate exact 
solutions to every problem in Indonesia, those groups also involved 
Indonesia in issues borne by Muslims in other parts of the world. For 
example, direct encounters with veterans of the Afghanistan war and 
the Moro Muslims movement in Philippines among some of their 
groups’ members, provided evidence of the concreteness of the threat 
to Muslims and thus the urgency of their involvement. Like 
mushrooms in the rainy season in a tropical fertile land, these militant 
groups grew rapidly after the New Order regime collapsed in 1998. Big 
cities like Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Solo, Surabaya, Medan, 
Palembang and Muslim-Christian conflict areas in Eastern Indonesia 
become the main enclaves of these movements. Their numerous 
publications, like books, leaflets, and weekly bulletins published by 
Wihdah Press and Al-Izzah Press as well as Suara Hidayatullah 
Magazine,44 Sabili Magazine,45 As-Salafi Magazine46 and Al-Islam and 
Al-Wa’ie Journals, just to mention a few, very clearly proclaimed their 
                                                 
43 Giora Eliraz, Islam in Indonesia, Modernism, Radicalism and the Middle East Dimension 
(Brighton, Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004).  
44 http://www.hidayatullah.com/   
45 http://www.sabili.co.id/    
46 http://salafy.cjb.net/    
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militant campaign. Many of these aforementioned groups, especially 
those with links to the Middle East, could be categorized, as Hefner 
calls them, as “neo-fundamentalist or neo-salafist” with strong beliefs 
that Israel and the US are leading an international conspiracy to 
destroy Islam and therefore armed jihad is a necessary response from 
Muslims.47 For them, the enemy is clear, present, and offensive.  
To paint a clearer picture of Islamic militancy in Indonesia, I will 
now provide a brief illustration of MMI,48 one of the strongest militant 
Muslim groups. This organization was established in Yogyakarta, the 
Indonesian center of education par excellence. Through the first and 
second Mujahidin Congresses held in Yogyakarta and Solo and 
attended by thousands of participants, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (67) was 
elected twice (2000-2003 and 2003-2008) as its leader.49 There is no 
accurate data on its membership today. Nevertheless, from its 
numerous branches in Java, Bali, Sumatra and other parts of Eastern 
Indonesia and the number of its delegates at the last two congresses, it 
can be inferred that its members could run to tens or even hundreds of 
thousands. Most of them are young and well-educated people. Irfan S 
Awwas, second to Ba’asyir, is a graduate from UGM.  
The main goal of MMI is the enforcement of Islamic Law in 
Indonesia. The “Jakarta Charter”, not surprisingly, is used by MMI as 
one of the main entry points to achieve their legal target. MMI is also 
very seriously and systematically presenting to the public the concept 
                                                 
47 Robert W Hefner, Civil Pluralism Denied? The New Media and Jihadi Violence in Indonesia, 
Unpublished paper (2002), p. 6.   
48 http://www.majelis.mujahidin.or.id  
49  Ba’asyir himself, a graduate from al-Irsyad University in 1963, is the central figure of 
pesantren Ngruki, Solo, Central Java, which he established in 1972. (Ngruki is an 
example of what I call a ‘political’ pesantren.) He was jailed for 9 years in 1983 due to his 
opposition to Pancasila as the sole foundation, and then escaped to Malaysia in 1985 
while his case was still in process. From then on he was actively involved in da`wah, 
both in Malaysia and Singapore. He returned to Indonesia in 1999 and organized 
MMI. He was arrested, charged with being head of Jama’ah Islamiah (JI), an alleged 
affiliation or partner group of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, and for his role as the 
intellectual actor behind the Bali bombing and other bombings in Indonesia. For his 
short biography, see http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/narasi/2004/04/17/nrs,-
20040417-02,id.html. Interestingly, Frederick Burk, a former official translator for US 
President, from Clinton to Bush, declares that the accusation of Ba’asyir in his 
involvement in JI is just an “American scenario” for the American government in 
particular, or for Western interests in general. About this, sees Riza Sihbudi, in 
http://www.republika.co.id/kolom_detail.asp?id=184149&kat_id=16  
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of Islamic shari >` ah. Trainings on h}udu>d (Islamic criminal law), including 
the law on adultery, apostasy, theft, drugs and even terrorism, are held 
regularly. Moving even further, MMI has already presented a draft of 
an amendment to alter the Indonesian constitution in order to make it 
fit Islamic Law. MMI members use almost every social, political, 
economic and cultural problem as example of the consequences of the 
implementation of secular kufr law and thus the immediate necessity 
for the application of Islamic Law as the final solution. Such themes as 
“Wanted: a President committed to Islamic Law” and “Being a Total 
Muslim: Plunging ourselves into Total Islamic Law” as well as “The 
Western Strategy to Destroy Islam” and the like are their main daily 
topics of discussion. Although so far none of their activities has been 
physically violent, obviously many items on their agenda are anti-
democratic and anti-pluralist—such as the stipulation that a non-
Muslim could not become president of Indonesia— and thus have 
resulted in various degrees of unease among non-Muslims.  
In the meantime, immediately before and soon after Soeharto was 
toppled in May 1998, various racial and inter-religious conflicts erupted 
in different places throughout the country such as the Tasikmalaya and 
Situbondo riots (1996), Pekalongan riot (1997), Ketapang riot (1998) 
and others.50 In Ambon, in eastern Indonesia, a vicious Muslim-
Christian conflict broke out in January 1999 and lasted more than a 
year. Assuming that government could not be trusted to handle these 
problems, Laskar Jihad, based in Yogyakarta and one of the most 
vehement militant groups sent thousands of its members to the 
conflict area.51 Understandably, the strong emergence of militant 
Muslims in the aforementioned conditions eventually resulted in deep 
concerns not only among non-Muslims, but also among Muslims 
themselves. As I mentioned earlier, claiming that many modern 
principles such as pluralism, tolerance, democracy, religious liberty, 
religion-state separation and others, are definitely compatible with 
Islamic teaching, Islamic liberalism had been developing since the 
                                                 
50 Read Mohtar Mas’oed et. al., Kekerasan Kolektif, Kondisi dan Pemicu (Yogyakarta: P3PK 
UGM, 2000).   
51 Discussion on Laskar Jihad, read, for example, Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics: 
The Rise of Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia,” Indonesia, No. 73 
(April 2002), pp. 165-169. Also read Sukidi Mulyadi, “Violence under the Banner of 
Religion: the Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus,” Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2 
(2003), pp. 75-110.   
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1970s in Indonesia. Obviously, since santri (referring to the people) and 
pesantren (referring either to the system of education, its physical 
building, neighborhood, culture or a certain section of society) were 
those who struggled with these Islamic-modernity compatibility issues, 
Islamic liberalism developed mostly among them, especially among 
young santris who had access to modern higher education. If Islamic 
militancy found a better place to grow in many secular state 
universities, IAIN52 (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Institute for 
Islamic Studies) and other private Islamic universities became the main 
development centers of Islamic liberalism.53 Together with IAIN, HMI 
and PMII, two major extra-campus Muslim students associations that 
used to be affiliated under Muhammadiyah and NU respectively, also 
played similar roles in sowing the seeds of Islamic liberalism.  
Among others, it was this young well-educated santri group that 
had serious concerns about the stronger emergence of Islamic 
militancy. From among them, various studies, forums, movements, 
networks and organizations soon emerged, either directly as 
counterweights to Islamic militancy, or indirectly, in a wider sense, as 
initiatives to promote inclusive, tolerant and liberal Islam in relation to 
specific issues such as pluralism, human rights, democratization, civil 
society, gender equality etc. Just to provide some examples, LKiS 
(Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial, Institute for Islam and Social 
Studies) was founded in Yogyakarta (1993), FSAS (Forum Studi 
Agama dan Sosial, Forum for Religious and Social Studies) was 
founded in Jepara (1997), Desantara was founded in Depok (1998), 
LAPAR (Lembaga Advokasi dan Pendidikan Anak Rakyat, Institute of 
the People’s Children for Advocacy and Education) was founded in 
                                                 
52 IAIN is a state Islamic university with a secular model, built in almost every 
provincial capital city and even in smaller towns throughout Indonesia. Due to 
cultural, economic and other reasons, most of its students come from santri families or 
a pesantren background. For more about IAIN read, for example, Johan Hendrik 
Meuleman, “The Institut Agama Islam Negeri at the Crossroad,” in Johan Hendrik 
Meuleman (ed.), Islam in the Era of Globalization, Muslim Attitude towards Modernity and 
Identity (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), pp. 281-298.   
53 Militant groups continually criticize IAIN over this concern. For example, read 
Hartono Ahmad Ja’iz, Ada Pemurtadan di IAIN (Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2005). 
After presenting the whole list of IAIN’s ‘sins’, the book concludes that there is a very 
dangerous, systematic conspiracy behind the project of liberalization of Islamic 
thought at IAIN, sponsored by the West in order to make Muslim youths finally 
renounce their faith.  
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Makassar (1999), JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal, Liberal Islam Network) 
was founded in Jakarta (2001), JIMM (Jaringan Intelektual Muda 
Muhammadiyah, Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network) was 
founded in Jakarta (2003) and many others.  
In this discussion, JIL will be presented as an example of liberal 
Muslim group since it uses liberal Islam as its self-reference.54 Unlike 
MMI, which was founded after a huge public gathering (tabligh akbar) 
attended by thousands of Muslims, JIL was founded at a very small 
meeting attended by some seven people. From the very beginning, 
JIL’s motive has been clear: “to counter the growing influence and 
activism of militant and radical Islam in Indonesia”. According to Ulil 
Abshar-Abdalla, who became the coordinator of JIL, “We’ve seen 
radical Islam grow militant, systematic and organized, while liberal 
Islam has been unorganized, week-seeming, not militant, not resistant 
and unassertive in giving voice to its perspective. The Liberal Islamic 
Network was in fact motivated by the appearance of these radical 
Islamic movements.”55 Thanks to an effective network, established by 
its exponents, both in terms of financial support and mass media, JIL 
achieved public recognition immediately.56  
As displayed on JIL’s website, ijtiha>d (defined as ‘rational thinking 
of Islamic texts), non-literal understanding of texts, pluralism, minority 
rights, religious liberty, the separation of religion and state, and 
democracy, are among JIL’s key words. Not surprisingly considering 
its initial motives, JIL’s main interest has been related to criticism of 
such things as intolerant attitudes among Muslims, religion as a source 
of violence, women’s oppression, literalism and formalism etc. In 
connection to that, Abshar-Abdalla, the coordinator, and JIL’s other  
main exponents, many of whom are very well trained both in pesantren 
                                                 
54 For general discussion on JIL, read Muhammad Ali, “The Rise of the Liberal Islam 
Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 
Vol. 22, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 1-27.   
55 Linda Christanty, “Is There a Rainbow in Islam,” Latitude Magazine, July 30, 2003.  
56 In terms of financial support, JIL is backed up significantly by The Asia Foundation 
and Freedom Institute, while in the mass media, it is supported mainly by Jawa Pos and 
68H Radio Channel in Jakarta. JIL also has its own beautiful bilingual Indonesian-
English website: http://www.islamlib.com.  
58 It should not be understood, however, that JIL’s members are all santri or that santri 
in general is identical to liberal. What I want to say here is that there is a strong relation 
between Islamic liberalism and young santris who have enough modern education.  
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and modern education systems,58 offer hermeneutic and theological 
breakthroughs in understanding Islam, particularly in relation to 
modern issues. In one of his most controversial articles, for example, 
Abshar-Abdalla argues that Islam is not a monument as assumed by 
many people. In understanding Islam, Muslims should really pay due 
attention to context and distinguish between the fundamental 
principles and their cultural manifestations. The jilbab (veil for women), 
hand-amputation, qis}a>s}, stoning, beards, wearing robes, are merely 
examples of Arabic cultures, and thus there is no obligation to practice 
them. Inter-marriage prohibition is now irrelevant; religion is basically 
a private matter; there is no such thing as ‘divine law’; Muhammad, the 
prophet, is a historical figure with some weaknesses and should be 
studied critically, [non-verbal] wahy did not stop after Muh}ammad, but 
is still being revealed, including among Western people with their 
modern achievements; religion, including Islam is just like a tool ‘for 
the total submission to the Absolute Truth’ and people should not 
quarrel with each other for the sake of it and that the real message of 
Islam is justice. The real message of Islam therefore is not the jilbab, 
domestication of women, growing beards, or shortening men’s pants. 
Human problems could never be solved by applying Islamic shari>` ah. 
To understand that Islamic shari>` ah is a ready-made packet from God 
to solve every human problem is an indication of ignorance and 
incapability to perceive sunnatullah itself. The most dangerous enemy of 
Islam is, in fact, dogmatism, to refer to Islam and the West as ‘us’ and 
‘them’ in the sense of ‘the good and evil’ consecutively, is a 
manifestation of a social pathology that eventually will destroy Islam 
itself.59  
This article that was injudiciously published during Ramad}a>n, 
immediately kindled furious reactions from militant Muslims. A death 
edict was even issued by a group of Muslim militant `ulama >’ in 
Bandung, West Java. Since its inception, JIL has stood in almost 
diametrical opposition to the militant groups. In many ways, 
apparently, each group has striven to eliminate the other. The most 
recent case erupted just a few months ago, when MUI (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Islamic scholars) issued 11 fatwas on 
various matters it claimed had been brought to the attention of this 
state-sponsor `ulama>’ council by the Indonesian Muslim public. One 
                                                 
59 Kompas, November 18, 2002.  
  
Achmad Munjid 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 01, June 2009 
62 
of them was the prohibition of liberalism, secularism and pluralism in 
Islam.60 As a result, the long-heated debate between both camps 
exploded again. Moreover, physical agitation and petitions by the 
militant groups to the government to dissolve JIL are still in the air as I 
write this paper.  
Particularly in the post-Bali-bombing and post 9/11 atmosphere, 
the ways JIL promotes liberal ideas and how it reconstructs or 
deconstructs Islam, are not unproblematic. For some people, if Muslim 
militants are assumed to suffer from religious paranoia, so do the 
liberals in JIL when they exaggerate the role of militants as the ‘whole’ 
problem of Islam today. Not only does this eventually lead JIL to apply 
what Hugh Goddard calls a ‘double standard’,61 comparing the ideal 
versus the real between modernism and Islam, which in turn makes 
them say too much ‘yes to the West’ while hyper-criticizing their fellow 
Muslims, but it is also unfair to Islam in general and unhelpful in 
improving Muslims’ situation and condition in particular.62  
It is easy to find a continuity of ideas between JIL and the previous 
Indonesian liberal Muslim thinkers such as Madjid and Wahid.63 
However, neither the way they address the issues nor how they 
articulate them is similar.64 As well as JIL’s initial motive as a counter-
movement, in my opinion, the sociological background of these young 
people has played a significant role here. Belonging to a generation 
from what was the ‘loser’ group, the santri, who could eventually 
escape their ‘ugly’ past thanks to modernization, now these young 
people are trying to redeem their past. In contrast to their past, thanks 
                                                 
60 The Jakarta Post, July 30, 2005.  
61 Hugh Goddard, Christians and Muslims: From Double Standards to Mutual Understanding 
(Richmond: Curzon Press, 1995).  
62 Read, for example, A. Mustofa Bisri, “Menyegarkan Kembali Sikap Islam, Beberapa 
Kesalahan Ulil Abshar-Abdalla,” Kompas, December 4, 2002.  
63 In fact, Madjid himself had great expectations of JIL as the next ‘locomotive’ of the 
Islamic thought reform movement in Indonesia. Read Budhi Munawar-Rachman, 
“Cak Nur dalam Ijtihad Paramadina,” Gatra, No. 43 (September 5, 2005).  
64 It is interesting to see some similarities between JIL and MWU (Muslim 
Wakeup.com) in relation to their ‘superior attitude’ towards other Muslims with 
different viewpoints that eventually resulted in uncomfortable relations with their co-
religionists. About PMU in this matter, for example read Muqtadir Khan, Is Muslim 
Wakeup.com Undermining the Progressive Muslim Movement? Visit: http://www.ijtihad.org/-
Muslimwakeup.htm.  
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to achievements in modern education, instead of backwardness, 
parochialism, static-mindedness, and the like, being santri has meant 
belonging to a privileged group with sufficient skills to explore the 
‘sacred territory’ of religion—a privilege which does not belong to 
those of an abangan background. By idealizing modernity and slapping 
the face of dogmatic, narrow-minded, out of context and ‘anti-rational’ 
Muslims, they have enjoyed intellectual pleasure as modern people. 
Thus they have redeemed their dark history.  
However, the same is the case with the militants on the opposite 
side. Belonging to a generation that could learn a great deal from the 
blessings in disguise of modernization, they have now become the real 
defenders of Islam. By idealizing Islamic history and at the same time 
vehemently fighting every supposed enemy of Islam, including 
Muslims who they assume to practice Islam incorrectly or only at their 
will, this group has enjoyed religious pleasure as the true Muslims. At 
the same time, they are also redeeming their ‘sinful’ past as abangan 
who were always accused of being irreligious, ignorant, and unfaithful. 
The challenge of Islamic liberalism only justifies their position as the 
group entrusted with defending the ‘true’ Islam.  
In relation to the experience of modernization under the “high 
modernist” ideology applied by Soeharto, apparently both liberals and 
militants are products of a modern education that suffered from a kind 
of ‘modernist arrogance’, both towards the past and towards others 
who have a different world view. Shaped under Soeharto’s national 
development project with its ‘high modernist’ ideology that saw itself 
as a rational solution for the future of man, ‘being educated’ for the 
liberal and ‘being religious’ for the militant, has meant being superior, 
and having a right to judge, or even to punish, the other.  
It is also worth noting that, despite their relation with 
modernization project launched by Soeharto’s government, in the final 
analysis, neither the militants nor the liberal Muslims featured in the 
New Order’s scenario. As we saw, militant Muslims emerged as an 
‘unintended, subversive result’ of the New Order’s agenda. While 
deriving benefits from modernization project, such as the adoption of 
technology and organization, they continued to oppose modernization 
as the main cause of the Muslim World’s degradation in general. More 
than anything else, the militants like MMI and Laskar Jihad believe that 
modernization, interrelated with Westernization, secularization and 
liberalism, is the epicenter of Muslim society’s catastrophe. These 
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phenomena constitute the enemy of most ‘real’ Muslims’, an enemy 
that should be conquered. On the other hand, as an ‘expected result’ of 
modernization, liberal Muslims have, in fact, adopted some key 
principles of the modern world, such as democracy, pluralism, civil and 
religious liberties, separation of religion and state, gender equality, 
freedom of speech and others. However, thanks to these modern 
ideas, interwoven with Islamic values, they could empower the 
structure and culture of civil society among Muslims to finally, in many 
cases, stand in opposition with Soeharto’s authoritarian state. In my 
opinion, therefore, the militants and the liberals are actually two 
unwanted twin children of the same mother by the name of 
modernization. Furthermore, due to their different backgrounds and 
perspectives on Islam, modernization has made them stand in 
opposition to each other and to compete over the ‘right’ place of Islam 
in the Indonesia of the future  
Conclusion 
As I have demonstrated, the interplay between Islam and 
modernity is always complex, with various degrees of hope, tension, 
struggle, unpredicted results, consequences, costs and paradoxes 
among Muslims. Based on the above discussion, let me now conclude 
this paper with several important points. First, the tension now 
manifest between liberal and militant Muslims in present day Indonesia 
is actually not a new phenomenon. It has deep roots in Indonesian 
Muslim history. Nevertheless, modernization has provided it with new 
and very different conditions, dimensions and orientations.  
Second, although Islam was initially used as political tool by 
Soeharto and his New Order government, both to support and to 
secure power, eventually Islam has its own story. Thanks to the 
improvement of public education through the massive development of 
SD Inpres and obligatory courses on religion in the 1970s as part of 
New Order’s effort in political mapping and social engineering, a 
significant shift in religious orientation among Muslims took place in 
the following decades. If, in the past, the santri group was among the 
most serious targets of modernization, due allegedly to their 
backwardness, parochialism, and static-mindedness, now they are the 
main exponents of Islamic liberalism. On the other hand, from an 
abangan background, a group that was assumed to be identical with 
unfaithfulness, polytheism, and ignorance of Islam, has now emerged 
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strong Islamic militancy. However, both groups eventually become 
counter movements to the New Order’s initial scenario of power.  
Third, in perceiving and competing with each other, both Muslim 
militants and liberals actually are redefining themselves while 
redeeming their own ‘dark’ history as produced by New Order’s 
modernization. The ‘ugly’ past for the santri group and the ‘sinful’ past 
for the abangan are redeemed by being liberal or militant. At the same 
time, by their antagonism, not only do they achieve a ‘privileged’ 
position, but also they enjoy a certain pleasure in accusing the other of 
being the ‘enemy’ of Islam. Apparently, the nature of the “high 
modernist” ideology under which both groups developed has 
significantly influenced their characters.  
Fourth, the present day conflict between Muslim militants and 
liberals over the ‘right’ place of Islam in Indonesia in fact reflects the 
long struggle of Muslims in the country in their negotiation with Islam, 
modernity and their social reality. 
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